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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
er the court will, when faced with the problem of whether
the plaintiff can garnishee himself as to a debt owing to or
property of a defendant in a situation in which the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, literally follow the lan-
guage of the decision and hold that this can not be done, or whether
it will distinguish that case and limit the holding of the instant
case to the scope of the syllabus, only time can tell.19
D. C. H.
"MINABLE" AND "MERCHANTABLE" COAL
The recent case of Tressler Coal Mining Co. v. Klefeld,1 has
revived a question to which, although potentially present in many
coal leases relatively little judicial attention has been directed.
By way of dicta the court discussed the meanings of the terms
"minable" and "merchantable" coal and cited the few available
authorities but undertook no discussion of the subject. Briefly,
the court said that "minable and merchantable coal is coal so
situate that it may be profitably mined and of such quality as to be
salable. "
Is there any difference between the terms minable and mer-
chantable, and, if so, what is it? The fact that each term, on
the surface at least, lies within the connotation of the other does
not alleviate the necessity of independent consideration of each
within its own sphere. In Atwater v. Fall River Pocahontas
Collicries Co.,; the court rejected as "narrow and arbitrary" the
proposition that minable. coal is any coal that can be mined, regard-
less of costs, and adopted the view of the Kentucky court which
declared ruinable coal to be that which "could be profitably mined
by judicious methods". 3  The adoption was qualified, however, by
assertion Ihat "the words must be defined in view of the wording
of the leases." In Ellis v. Cricket Coal Co.,' the Iowa court
presents a more comprehensive analysis of the terms in question:
'9 See Hardman, "The Law" - In West Virginia (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q.
23; "The Syllabu's Is the Law", id. at page 141; "The Syllabus Is the Law'"-
Another Word, id. at page 209; "The Syllabus Is the Law" - Another Word
by Fox, J. (1942) 48 W. VA. L. Q. 55.
20 See, in addition to the cases herein cited, Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R.
711 and (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1458.
124 S. E. (2d) 98 (W. Va. 1943).
2 119 W. Va. 549, 195 S. E. 99 (1937).
3 Aixier Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal Co., 194 Ky. 14, 238 S. W. 189 (1922).
4 166 Iowa 656, 661, 148 N. W. 887 (1914).
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"Thus as bearing on the minable character of coal, its
accessibility, the condition of the earth over it, the interfer-
ence by water, whether free from or mixed with other sub-
stances, must be taken into account and where removal as
an article of commerce is contemplated, the cost of mining
and bringing the coal to the surface is a controlling con-
sideration."
The lease involved in the case of Big Vein Pocahontas Co. v.
Browning,' employed the term "available" (which would seem
synonymous with minable), and the court said that it included
all coal recoverable as a practical and reasonable mining
proposition, considering actual conditions, costs and all surround-
ing circumstances." Another analogous term occasionally employed
is "workable." An English writer has said in this connection,
"'unworkable' does not mean physically unworkable, but 'unwork-
able without serious loss over a considerable period of time.' ,0
Relative to timber it has been said that "The term 'merchant-
able' is not one that the law can define; and the sense in which it
was used must be left to the determination of the jury'' T, neverthe-
less, there are several judicial definitions of "merchantable" as
regards coal. The Big Vein Pocahtontas Company case declared
merchantable to mean "not coal which under all conditions can
be handled at a profit, but coal which is ordinarily used. for sale,
and can be usually sold at a profit."
Mere casual observation is sufficient to indicate a degree of
interdependence between the two terms minable and merchantable,
but it is the contention of the writer that the relationship goes
beyond interdependence 'and at least approaches, if not equals,
synonymity. The single factor which ultimately controls every
act of the coal operator is profit; thus it is the element of profit
which acts as the binding agent between minable and merchant-
able. Coal is not minable if the cost of its mining exceeds the
price it will bring on the market, nor is it merchantable if its
quality is such that it cannot fetch a price sufficient to offset its
cost of production. The court in the Ellis case forcibly empha-
sized profit as the controlling factor:
". .. in making use of the expression 'merchantable
and minable,' the parties evidently intended that the coal
5137 Va. 34, 120 S. E. 247 (1923).
6 McSw -xLv, MSImEs (4th ed. 1912) 252.
7Pardee v. C. Crane & Co., 74 W. Va. 359, 367, 82 S. E. 340, 343 (1914);
Ragland .& Co. v. Butler, 18 Gratt. 323, 336 (Va. 1868).
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to be paid for should be salable on the market, and that it
be such as could be mined at a cost such as that defendant
could put it on the market at some profit to itself."
And further along in the opinion,
"A mine may not be minable because of the condition
of the coal, its distance from transportation, the character
of the mine, and other circumstances, but these facts are merely
explanatory of the real reason (i. e., that the mining cannot
be done at a profit), and, by the use of this expression, the
parties surely intend that liability for minumum royalty
should not attach, unless the coal was salable and could be
mined at a reasonable profit.""
It is to be noted that the courts frequently consider the terms
together rather than distinguish between them individually, as
in Flavelle v. Red Jacket Coal & Coke Co.' In that case the lease
required the lessee to mine "all available, workable, and merchant-
able coal." The court said that. if the difference between the
cost of mining and the profits to be derived therefrom was "such
as to deter an ordinarily prudent and practical operator from
mining it, such coal (was) not within the meaning of such descrip-
tive ternLs." In Martins Fork Coal Co. v. Harlan Wallins Coal
Co.,10 in discussing the term merchantable the court said that
"it certainly includes the idea of workability. It cannot be
merchantable if it is not workable. It would seem also to include
the idea of being mined and sold at a profit" under ordinary or
average conditions."'
No case has been found in which any attempt has been made
to establish a reasonable differentiation between the terms minable
and merchantable. An analysis of those cases which construe
the terms independently of one another generally reveals a single
definition expressed by two sets of words, i. e., the same thing said
8At pages 661-662. Italics supplied.
9 82 W. Va. 295, syl. 4, 96 S. E. 600 (1918).
10 14 F. Supp. 902 (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1934).
11 In the ease of Hughes v. National Fuel Co., 121 W. Va. 392, 3 S. E.
(2d) 621 (1929), counsel for both parties argued extensively in the trial
court and in their briefs to the supreme court the issue of whether ruinable coal
meant all coal which could be removed and usually sold at a profit, but not
necessarily a profit under all conditions (contended for by the lessor and
sustained by the trial court), or whether it meant that coal which could
be profitably mined by judicious methods (contention of the lessee). See 121
H-J SUP. CT. REcoRDs .n BRFS). Judgment for the lessor in the lower
court was reversed on a different point and the supreme court made no mention
of this assignment of error. The writer makes no attempt in this note to
discuss this issue.
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two different ways.12 No decision has hinted that the presence
of both terms might supplement the force and effect of one of
them standing alone. Thus a covenant to remove all "minable and
merchantable" coal -would have no greater legal signifiance than
a covenant merely to remove all "minable" coal, or all "mer-
chantable" coal. The operator expects to remove, and should be
bound to remove under leases providing for a tonnage royalty,
all coal minable at a profit (to avoid incidental argument, say
profit under "normal conditions"), and use of the term minable
or merchantable, or both, is but a means whereby the goal of
fair and reasonable production may be better secured. Both
terms qualify the operator's expected profit but can it be said
that the influence of one is greater than that of the other? It
is believed not.
G.S. B.
SEPARATE RECOVERY IN STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE SUIT
The nature of the stockholder's derivative suit has already
been discussed at length in an earlier issue of the Law Quarterly.'
The problem now arises as to whether there can properly be a
separate or partial recovery in the derivative suit, and on this
controversial issue the authorities are divided. On the one side,
the courts are persuasive in their argument that to permit sepa-
rate recovery is to defeat the rights of creditors of the corpora-
tion and to disregard the fiction of corporate entity.2 "Otherwise
than in name the action is by the corporation, and if relief be
obtained it belongs, not to the stockholder bringing the action
but to the corporation.'"' However, on the other side, the pro-
ponents of a separate recovery claim that there are instances where
substantially all other stockholders are defendants in pari delicto
with the wrongdoers, and it would be unjust to grant a judgment
for the benefit of the corporation. And similarly where the wrong-
doers are still in control, circuity of action and multiplied litiga-
12 For example, Tressler Coal Min. Co. v. Klefeld, 24 S. E. (2d) 98, 101
(W. Va. 1943).
1 Note (1938) 44 W. VA. L. Q. 129.
2 Eshleman v. Keenan, 22 Del. Ch. 82, 187 Atl. 25 (1938); Dawklns v.
Mitchell, 149 La. 1038, 90 So. 396 (1922); Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc.
366, 190 N. Y. Supp. 61 (3921); STEVENS, CORPOnAToNs (1936) 659-660.
33 FLETH ., PRiVA.TE CORPoRAriONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 5953.
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